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EVICTION PROCEDURES IN PUBLIC HOUSING
An emerging legal problem concerns the relationship between
a public housing authority and its tenants with respect to the pro-
cedural requirements necessary for the authority to terminate
tenancies. The issue is of paramount importance to the more than
2,100,000 people who are currently living in various types of low-rent
public housing.' With vast increases in public expenditures
planned for the future, 2 the issue takes on greater sociological
importance.
In Vinson v. Greensburgh Housing Authority,8 plaintiffs sought
to stay summary eviction proceedings and to annul a determination
of the housing authority terminating their lease. The lease was a
typical month-to-month periodic tenancy terminable by either
party upon giving requisite notice. The authority gave the re-
quired one month's notice; upon refusal of the tenant to vacate it
instituted summary eviction proceedings.4
The plaintiffs argued that they had fully complied with the
authority's own regulations pertaining to tenant's rights to continue
occupancy, and that the failure of the authority to state specific
reasons for its action was a violation of the tenant's right to due
process of law.5 The authority argued that it was not required to
give any reason for its action, and that the determination was
neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial act and hence not review-
able by the court.6
The court held that a tenant's right to continued occupancy
may not be arbitrarily terminated by a state-created municipal
housing authority exercising its express contractual power of ter-
mination. The court required that the authority fully articulate the
grounds upon which it made its determination and that these
grounds be reasonable. 7 The termination must not rest upon mere
whim or caprice.8 In dictum the court qualified its decision by
stating that the authority's power should not be restrained in situ-
1. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 642 (1966).
2. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448,
§ 203 (July 25, 1968).
3. 29 App. Div. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968).
4. Id. at 392, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
5. Id. at 394, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
6. Id. at 394, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
7. Id. at 398, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
8. Id. at 396, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
ations where the termination is reasonable and is required for the
betterment of the entire housing community.9
The dissent in Vinson argued that in the absence of express
legislation the procedural requirements which the authority must
follow need only be that which is required of a private landlord.
To require the authority to submit to interrogation and investiga-
tion would be an unreasonable burden.10 The dissent also stated
that the standard applied should be based upon common law re-
quirements.
To fully understand the issue involved in Vinson, it is neces-
sary to examine the common law of landlord and tenant with re-
spect to procedural requirements necessary for terminating a
periodic tenancy.
LANDLORD'S POWER To TERMINATE PERIODIC
TENANCY UNDER COMMON LAW
The month-to-month periodic tenancy found in Vinson is uti-
lized by most housing authorities throughout the United States."
It is a variation of the older tenancy-at-will.' 2 The periodic ten-
ancy appeared to develop from a desire to avoid some of the harsh-
ness of the tenancy-at-will. 3 This harshness concerned the ten-
ant's rights to emblements 4 upon the termination of a tenancy-
at-will- by the landlord. 5 Even though the landlord may have
validly terminated this type of tenancy, this right assured the
tenant the use of the land until maturity of the crop without lia-
bility for rent. From the tenant's viewpoint, occupancy after
termination was undesirable because it limited his rights to use the
land expressly to gathering the crops. Faced with these undesir-
able consequences, the common law courts developed the periodic
tenancy.'6
Because it is the nature of the periodic tenancy to continue
indefinitely, the common law applied strict rules relating to the
9. Id. at 396, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
10. Accord, Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority, 120 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1941).
11. Friedman, supra note 1, at 660.
12. Marcus, Periodic Tenancies, 7 FORD. L. REv. 167 (1938).
13. 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW or LANDLORD AND TENANT 121 (1912).
14. The vegetable chattels called "emblements" are the corn or other
growth of the earth which are produced annually, and not spontaneously,
but by labor and industry... " BLACK's LAw DICTiONARY 614 (4th ed. 1968).
15. 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, at 120.
16. The tenancy from year to year was probably developed to elimi-
nate the disadvantages of the tenancy at will. The landlord was given
the option of terminating the tenancy during a time in which the tenant
would have sufficient notice to forestall seasonal replanting. Upon lawful
termination the tenant's rights in the land were completely extinguished.
If the landlord failed to give seasonable notification of termination, he




notice required to terminate the lease.' 7 If there was an express
power of termination vested in the landlord he could exercise it at
any time, and the tenant had no defense to eviction. It was not
necessary for the landlord to give any reason for the termination.'8
The tenant had no right to question his reason or attack his moti-
vations.19 Although the landlord's power to terminate remained
substantially unhampered at common law, the tenant's obligation to
pay rent was sometimes suspended through the application of the
doctrine of constructive eviction.
20
There were broad policy considerations underlying the common
law rule which left the landlord's power of termination substan-
tially unrestricted. They reflected the socio-economic pressures
under which the Anglo-American legal system developed. Prior to
the industrial revolution in England free alienability of land was
not desired by the feudal lords who sought to prepetuate their
family fortunes by assuring that the primary measure of wealth,
the land, remained in family possession.21 Disintegration of the
feudal system and emergence of the industrial revolution created
an atmosphere conducive to free alienability of land. As wealth
became more common the land continued to retain its intrinsic
uniqueness as a measure of wealth, but became more susceptible
to economic pressures of the market.
22
Unlike England, land in the United States has always been
relatively plentiful. Being in sufficient supply, it was generally
possible to purchase whatever land was desired. The price paid
17. Hartnip v. Fields, 247 Wis. 473, 19 N.W.2d 878 (1945), which holds
that not only must a thirty days notice be given to terminate a month-to-
month periodic tenancy, the period upon which the notice expires must
coincide with the date the rent is due.
18. E.g., Angel v. Black Band Consolidated Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 47,
122 S.E. 276 (1924).
19. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Bowary, 234 Mass. 231, 85 N.E.2d 435 (1945);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693
(Sup. Ct. 1964); Stapelton v. Horton, 183 Pa. Super. 198, 130 A.2d 250 (1957).
20. The tenant could move without liability for rent if his occupancy
of the premises was so interfered with that he was forced to discontinue
the tenancy, e.g., Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340
Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1935). For the principal to operate, however, it was
necessary for the tenant to vacate, see Polumbo v. Olimpia Theaters, 278
Mass. 84, 176 N.E. 815 (1931).
21. R. MEGARRY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 80 (1957). The feudal
lords brought pressure on Parliament which resulted in the creation of the
Fee Tail, limiting the alienation of the land by the heir, Statute De Donis
Conditionalibus (1285).
22. The common law for centuries has favored the policy of free
alienability; a policy which has since been recognized by a statute, id.
n.18.
for the land varied with the market pressure of demand as land
has been generally susceptible to the pressure of the market.
A competitive market required that the supply of real property
remains as fluid as possible.2  Restraints on land such as lease-
holds tended to limit the supply. Leaseholds were necessarily held
valid but were strictly limited to the terms of the agreement.
24
The landlord was given the prerogative of allocating his land as
he desired, subject only to limitations of public policy.25
An essential factor in promoting the economically desirable
competitive market was the landlord's power to unburden his
property from a tenancy. The supply of real property free of
restraints would then be able to react to the demand, resulting in
an effectively competitive market.
26
Another basic policy underlying the common law rule as to
leaseholds was the landlord's right to freedom of contract. Al-
though related to the economic policy, this goal is based on some-
what different foundations.27  The concept of freedom of contract
developed from the traditional Anglo-Saxon respect for the indi-
vidual.28 The right to freedom of contract has been limited, how-
ever, when the enjoyment of the right contravenes public policy. 29
FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON THE LANDLORD'S
COMMON LAW POWER OF TERMINATION
The common law rule allowing the landlord almost unre-
stricted termination powers over leases is based on sound economic
and social policy when applied to situations involving solely pri-
vate individuals. There have been, however, limitations placed on
the rule which have restricted it. 0 These limitations have been
23. The total supply of land is constant, only that portion of the
supply free of restraint varies and is affected by pressures of demand.
24. The parol evidence rule renders inadmissible all oral or written
modifications entered into prior to the written contract, and contemporane-
ous oral modifications if that contract is intended to be a final and com-
plete expression of the relationship between the parties, see L. SIMPsON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 98, at 195 (2d ed. 1965).
25. The landlord was required at common law to refrain from using
his land so as to create either a public or private nuisance. The landlord
was also required to refrain from employing his property in any illegal
manner.
26. The competitive market was desirable because its operation assures
that the greatest use of the land will be accomplished at the lowest pos-
sible rent.
27. Freedom of contract developed from the basic political freedoms
enjoyed by the English, stemming originally from the Magna Carta.
28. Naturally, the serfs in England were limited in their freedom of
contract through the Middle Ages, but as the industrial revolution disrupted
the earlier social system, eventually, even these people were able to make
the contracts they desired.
29. Contracts which are violative of public policy usually involve an
illegal subject matter, and as such the court will not enforce them.




imposed where either the courts or the legislature have concluded
that the common law rule is inadequate in unique situations.
One type of limitation on the landlord's power to terminate
involves rent control legislation. 31 The primary purpose of this
legislation is to insure that the competitive market for housing
would remain stable during periods when the demand for such
housing greatly exceeds the supply.32 The landlord is required by
statute to comply with specific regulations established by the hous-
ing administrator to effectuate the termination of the tenant's
occupancy.8 3 The landlord is required to state reasons for his ac-
tions and these reasons could be rejected by the administrator.
This type of legislation is constitutional.
3 4
Similarly, laws which empower welfare agencies to with-
hold rent from the private landlord, by placing the rent in escrow
accounts, are constitutional. 5 New York and Pennsylvania have
such statutes.3 6 The Pennsylvania statute empowers an official 7
to certify a dwelling as unfit for human habitation. Upon such
certification the duty to pay rent to the landlord is suspended. The
tenant, however, is required to pay the rent into an escrow ac-
count.18  The statute states: "No tenant shall be evicted for any
reason whatsoever while rent is deposited in escrow."3 9 The land-
31. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1894 (1951) (repealed 1953).
32. The purpose underlying the policy of rent control is that in a
period of scarcity of living accommodations tenants who used such ac-
commodations as their homes are not to be subjected to high rental rates
which free competition produces; see Woods v. Polino, 86 F. Supp. 65
(S.D. W. Va. 1949).
33. The landlord was required to apply for a certificate of eviction if
he desired to effectuate termination. The document was then issued by
the housing administrator if in his discretion such termination was war-
ranted; see Calvin v. Martin, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 265, 111 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio
App. 1952).
34. Block v. Husch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
35. Schaeffer v. Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y.C. 1962), which held that the Spiegel Bill, SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 143-b
(McKinney 1966) was constitutional. The Spiegel Bill allows a tenant who
is receiving welfare allotments to withhold payment of rent from a land-
lord who fails to maintain the premises. The tenant deposits the rent in
an escrow account administered by a welfare official.
36. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW, § 143-b (McKinney 1966); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1967).
37. The Pennsylvania statute empowers officials of the Department
of Licenses, Public Safety, or Public Health Department to collect the rent
to be put into escrow accounts.
38. The Pennsylvania statute is broader than New York's legislation.
While New York limits its Act to tenants who are recipients of social wel-
fare allotments, Pennsylvania's legislation applies to all tenants who live
in certain class cities.
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1967).
lord's power of termination is clearly limited by this form of legis-
lation.
The landlord's power of termination has also been limited
where termination is used to restrict a legal right which the legis-
lature has conferred on the tenant.4 Most of these cases have
arisen because of a violation of the tenant's civil rights under
federal law. Similarly, the landlord may have the power to termi-
nate but the right to exercise that power is subject to statutory
modification.4 1  In In re Quarles42 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that it was unlawful to conspire to interfere with legis-
lative rights granted to an individual.
4
Finally, there are cases in which the landlord's power of termi-
nation is restricted because it is a governmental agency. Vinson v.
Greensburgh Housing Authority is such a case. These cases turn
on a legal distinction between the public authority and the private
landlord.
44
In Rudder v. United States45 the government, as the landlord,
attempted by authority of the Gwinn Amendment 4" to evict a ten-
ant because he refused to sign a certificate of non-membership in
40. United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961). The court
stated that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1964), was violated by
the defendants. The court stated,
... threats and intimidations may take on many forms .... The
evidence amply supports the government's claim that a part of the
plan . . . to intimidate negro voters, for the purpose of interfering
with their rights of registering and voting, was to have them
evicted from the land they occupied as tenants.
Id. at 256. See Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d
242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (held that a landlord may not
evict a tenant on the basis of race).
41. N.L.R.B. v. Lamar Creamery Co., 246 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1957); John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. N.L.R.B., 89 U.S. App. D.C. 261,
191 F.2d 483 (U.S. Ct. App. D.C. 1951), where the courts in applying the
National Labor Relations Act, that it was an unfair labor practice for an
employer to deny continued employment to one who has filed charges
against him.
42. 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
43. Id. at 537. The right involved in In re Quarles was the right to
inform a United States Marshal of violations of the Internal Revenue Law.
44. Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Housing Au-
thority of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 883, 279 P.2d 215
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1955); Housing Authority of Chicago v.
Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954); Kutcher v. Housing Author-
ity of Newark, 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Peters v. New York Housing
Authority, 1 App. Div. 2d 694, 147 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1955); Lawson v. Housing
Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1954), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 882 (1955).
45. 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
46. Acts of July 5, 1952, ch. 302, § 101, 67 Stat. 307. The statute states,
that no housing unit constructed under the United States Housing
Act of 1937, as amended, shall be occupied by any person who is a
member of an organization designated subversive by the Attorney
General: Provided further, that the foregoing prohibition shall
be enforced by the local authorities. ...
Note: this legislation lapsed and was not renewed after 1954.
Comments
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certain alleged subversive organizations. The court held that the
evictions were violative of due process of law because the tenant
was given no fair hearing and was not proven to be a subversive
within the meaning of the Amendment.47 The court stated: "The
government as landlord is still the government. It must not act
arbitrarily, for unlike private landlords, it is subject to the require-
ments of due process of law. Arbitrary action is not due process of
law."48 The reluctance of the courts to allow terminations under
the Gwinn Amendment has resulted in reversals of numerous
evictions.
49
Courts have been very reluctant to apply the due process limi-
tations beyond the particular facts of the Gwinn Amendment cases.
In Housing Authority of Pittsburgh v. Turner0 the court, in deter-
mining whether a public housing authority should be required to
give reasons for its termination of a lease, concluded that the due
process requirements of the Gwinn Amendment cases were not ap-
plicable to a case of routine termination.5 1 The Turner court side-
stepped the requirements of due process by stating that the Gwinn
Amendment cases only required a hearing and notice of reasons
for termination because the tenant was forced to comply with an
unconstitutional requirement.52 The court implied that in a "rou-
tine" termination no unconstitutional requirement is forced on the
tenant; therefore, the Gwinn Amendment cases are not on point.58
It has also been ruled that it is unnecessary for a public hous-
ing authority to allege any objectionable behavior by the tenant
to make out a prima facie case in eviction proceedings.
54
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
It is the express policy of the United States Housing Act of
193755 to
47. 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
48. Id.
49. Cases cited note 44 supra.
50. 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963).
51. In Turner the court relied on a series of cases which have not re-
quired the public housing authority to give any reasons for the termination
involved. Accord, Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309
(1949); Chicago Housing Authority v. Ivory, 341 Ill. App. 282, 93 N.E.2d
386 (1950); Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Simpson, 85 Ohio
App. 73, 85 N.E.2d 560 (1949); Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority
v. Stires, 84 Ohio App. 331, 84 N.E.2d 279 (1949).
52. 201 Pa. Super. at 68, 191 A.2d at 871.
53. Id.
54. See New York Housing Authority v. Russ, 1 Misc. 2d 170, 134
N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1964).
vest in the local housing agencies the maximum amount
of responsibility in administering the low-rent housing pro-
gram, including the establishment of rents and eligibility
requirements (subject to the approval of the Authority),
with due consideration to accomplish the objectives of this
chapter .... 5
Courts have interpreted this policy as an authorization for the
states to manage their own housing programs in any reasonable
manner. The procedural requirements necessary to effectively ter-
minate tenancies also has been left largely to state discretion.57
To be eligible for federally appropriated low-rent housing
funds, each state is required to draft its own public housing law.58
The states then delegate to local authorities the powers necessary
to effectuate the program. The express powers which the states
vest in the individual housing authorities involve a broad scope of
administrative discretion. 59 The local authorities are the primary
rule-making bodies and are given the power by state statute to
promulgate necessary regulations and to control the actual require-'
ments for termination.60
The power of the local authority to issue regulations is not
unlimited; it must comply with the statutory standards under
which it was created. The regulations are either in harmony with
these standards, or they are an abuse of discretion. The courts
apply judicial review to limit the abuse of discretionary power by
the local authorities.
In Sanders v. Cruise6' the court limited a housing authority's
regulatory powers to terminate a lease. The tenants were ordered
to vacate their apartment on the grounds that they were "undesir-
ables" under the enacted regulations.2 The authority cited as
56. Id. § 101.
57. The discretionary power of the states in determining procedural
requirements has recently been sought to be limited, see discussion of
Department of Housing and Urban Development's Circular infra p.
58. Examples of these statutes are, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:14A3151-58
(1964); PUBLIC HOUSING LAW §§ 1-518 (McKinney Supp. 1968); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, §§ 151-1700 (Supp. 1967).
59. The Pennsylvania statute is typical of the broad powers which
have been conferred on the public housing authority. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35
§ 1550(K) (Supp. 1967) authorizes the authority: "To lease or rent any of
the dwellings or any other accommodations or any of the lands, buildings,
structures or facilities embraced in any housing project, and (subject to
the limitations contained in this act) to establish and revise the rents or
charges therefor."60. The public housing authority's regulations are strictly a matter of
the local administrations discretion, subject only to the broad statutory
policy upon which the authority was granted its powers, for an example of
particular regulation relative to requirements for continued occupancy
infra note 62.
61. 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
62. Resolution 53-6-417 adopted June 25, 1953, as amended, requires
that the:
standard to be used in approving the eligibility for continued occu-
Comments
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the reason for its action the conviction of the tenant's son for using
narcotics. The termination was effected although the son had not
been living with his parents for more than a year. The court in
reviewing the authority's decision disallowed the termination on
the basis that it was patently unreasonable in light of the author-
ity's own regulations.
6 3
Since the authority in Sanders gave the reasons upon which
it based its determination, the court did not decide the precise issue
of procedural requirements. The case does imply that a standard
of reasonableness is required of a public housing authority when
it exercises its power of termination.6 4
ATMPT TO CLARIFY THE AREA
The Department of Housing and Urban Development" issued
a Circular attempting to clarify the procedural requirements neces-
sary for a public housing authority to effectuate termination of
leases.6 6 The Circular states that notice of the reasons for termi-
pancy of a family upon such ground shall be that, in light of its
conduct and behavior while residing in the project, the family
does not constitute (1) a detriment to the health, safety or morals
of its neighbors or the community, (2) an adverse influence upon
sound family and communal life, (3) a source of danger of a cause
of damage to premises or property of the Authority, (4) or a source
of danger to the peaceful occupation of the other tenants or (5) a
nuisance.
Id. at 535.
63. 10 Misc. 2d at 537, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
64. 10 Misc. 2d at 535, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
65. Hereinafter cited as H.U.D.
66. The Circular "Terminations of Tenancies in Low-Rent Projects"
states, in part:
Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it essential
that no tenant be given notice to vacate without being told by
the local authority, in a private conference or other appropriate
manner, the reasons for eviction, and be given an opportunity to
make such reply or explanation as he may wish. In addition to
informing the tenant of the reasons for any proposed eviction ac-
tion, from this date each Local Authority shall maintain a written
record of every eviction from the federally assisted public hous-
ing. Such records are to be available for review from time to
time by H.U.D. representatives and shall contain the following
information:
1. The name of the tenant and identification of unit occupied.
2. Date of notice to vacate.
3. Specific reason(s) for notice to vacate. For example, if a
tenant is being evicted because of undesirable actions, the
record should detail the actions which resulted in the deter-
mination that the eviction should be instituted.
4. Date and method of notifying tenant with summary of any
conferences with tenant, including names of conference
participants.
5. Date and description of final action taken.
H.U.D. Circular, February 17, 1967.
nations and hearings be given by the authority.6 The legal effect
of the Circular is still uncertain.6" Some courts have elected to
follow its requirements; 69 others have held it does not enlarge the
rights of the tenants.
70
Lancaster Housing Authority v. Gardner7' is an example where
the court ruled the Circular inapplicable. In Gardner the court
stated:
The Circular does not enlarge the rights of tenants or cur-
tail those of the Authority-Landlord. It merely assures
the tenants that their continued occupancy is not depend-
ent upon compliance with unconstitutional requirements.
72
In Williams v. Housing Authority of Atlanta,13 where the Cir-
cular's effect was also raised, the court ruled that the directive's
requirements were fulfilled. There was sufficient compliance
where the administrator of the authority had stated the reasons
for the authority's action in a pretrail deposition which was made
available to the tenant.
7 4
The precise issue of the Circular's legal effect is now pending




While a number of cases have sought to test the procedural
requirements followed by housing authorities in terminating
leases, 6 Thorpe7 is the leading case on this issue. There a tenant
67. Id.
68. The issue of Circular's precise legal effects is now pending before
the United States Supreme Court infra note 75.
69. Vinson v. Greensburgh Housing Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 388,
288 N.Y.S. 159 (1968). See WEL. L. BULL., Index 5 (March 1968).
70. See Chicago Housing Authority v. Stewart, No. 40796. (Ill. Sup.
Ct. May 29, 1968) where the court refused to allow the Circular to have
any effect on the requirements necessary for the authority to terminate the
tenant's lease. The court scorned the idea that the H.U.D. Circular had
any legal effect calling it "a mere departmental policy adopted in the in-
terest of good public relations," 14 WEL. L. BULL. 10 (Sept. 1968).
71. 211 Pa. Super. 502, 240 A.2d 566 (1968). In this case the tenant
sought to reverse a determination of the authority to terminate her lease
because she claimed she was denied a hearing which was required under
the H.U.D. Circular.
72. Id. at 507, 240 A.2d at 268.
73. 223 Ga. 407, 155 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
74. 155 S.E.2d at 167.
75. 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966), vacated and remanded, 386
U.S. 670 (1967), aff'd on rehearing, 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E.2d 147 (1968), cert.
granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
76. E.g., Trotman v. Syracuse Housing Authority, No. 68-CV-66 (N.D.
N.Y., filed Feb. 20, 1968); Quevedo v. Collins, No. CA-3-2626-C (N.D. Tex.,
Order filed July 12, 1968). These are cases in which the tenants have
questioned the administrative procedures by which the authority has ter-
minated the tenants' right to continue occupancy. See also 11 WEL. L.
BULL. 5 (Jan. 1968).
77. Case cited note 75 supra.
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in a public housing project attempted to organize a tenants' asso-
ciation. The authority learned of these activities and gave con-
tractually valid notice of termination. The tenant appealed the
subsequent eviction on the basis of a violation of due process of
law. The tenant argued it was unconstitutional to be denied a
hearing in situations where a public housing authority terminates
a lease. The state court rejected the tenant's argument and up-
held the eviction.7 8 The tenant appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. Prior to the argument, but after the briefs were
filed, H.U.D. promulgated its Circular on the procedural require-
ments for termination of tenancies in public housing.7 9
The tenant in Thorpe argued that the Circular's requirements
should be applied to the pending case. The United States Supreme
Court vacated the state court's decision and remanded the case,
"... for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in light
of the . . . Circular .. ,"8o But the Court stated that: "The legal
effect of the Circular, the extent to which it binds local authorities,
and whether it is in fact applicable to the Petitioners are questons
we do not decide."8 ' Because the Circular was issued after the
state court's decision, the Court ruled it was inappropriate for it to
decide the precise issue of the Circular's legal effect before the
state court had the opportunity to apply H.U.D.'s directive to the
pending case.
The state court then reheard Thorpe and affirmed its prior
decision holding that the Circular did not have retroactive effect
and therefore was not applicable to the case.82 The tenant has
again appealed from the state court's decision and certiorari has
been granted by the United States Supreme Court. 8 In rehearing
Thorpe the Supreme Court should clarify the legal effect of the
Circular's procedural requirements in that the Court will decide
whether the tenant was denied due process by a denial of the type
of rehearing required by the Circular.
4
78. 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1968).
79. H.U.D. Circular, cited note 66 supra.
80. 386 U.S. 670, 674.
81. Id. at 673.
82. 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E.2d 147 (1968).
83. 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
84. 37 U.S.L.W. 3012 (U.S. July 2, 1968). The Court has decided to
specifically rule on: (1) whether the tenant was deprived of due process of
law by the authority's refusal to grant a hearing and give notice of its
reasons for the termination; and (2) whether the tenant has the legal right
to a hearing and notice by virtue of the Directive.
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN TERMINATIONS
OF PUBLIC HOUSING LEASES
As stated previously, whether a housing authority has the right
to terminate a lease agreement without stating its reasons or allow-
ing for a hearing has traditionally been decided affirmatively on
the grounds of freedom of contract.8 5 The proponents of this view
argue that the mere fact that the landlord happens to be the gov-
ernment is immaterial.86 When specific conditions are set forth
in the lease, both parties are legally bound to comply with them. 7
The contention that the government or administrative agency
should be treated differently in contract matters would appear to
be refuted by language in Lynch v. United States:8 "When the
United States enters into contract relations, its rights and liabilities
therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts
between private individuals."89 This case is often cited by those
courts which have held the authority to have the same right to ter-
minate a tenancy as that possessed by a private landlord.90
This reasoning is open to attack. The traditional argument
that the public landlord should be treated in the same manner as
his private counterpart is an unsound economic equation. The
economic policy upon which the public housing program is based
varies considerably from the policy upon which private landlord
tenant law is based. Profit motivation is the ultimate economic
policy upon which the law with respect to the private landlord is
based. The law enables the private landlord to substitute a new
tenant for the old. The new lessee may be willing to pay a higher
rent, thus the landlord's profit will be increased given constant costs.
It is the express function of the public authority to provide the
most suitable housing at the lowest rent possible; profit motivation
is not involved. When rent revenues of the authority are exceeded
by its expenses, the deficit is balanced by government subsidies.
The goal is social welfare not higher rents. Therefore, there is no
sound economic reason for treating the public authority and pri-
vate landlord in the same legal manner.
Further recognition should be given to the fact that statutory
authorization is the primary base upon which an authority oper-
ates.91 The argument that parties in a public housing lease are
bound by the limitations of the contract fails to fully recognize
this point. In Vinson the court stated: "The statute consequently
85. Cases cited note 51 supra.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
89. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
90. E.g., Turner v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 201 Pa. Super. 62,
191 A.2d 869 (1963); Vinson v. Greensburgh Housing Authority, 29 App.
Div. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968) (dissent).
91. Statute cited note 59 supra.
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enters into and becomes part of the lease; and its spirit and intent
must be the guiding beacon in the interpretation of the terms of
the lease. '9 2 In New York Housing Authority v. Russ 3 it was
stated by the dissent that, ". . . the 'lease agreement' is only part
of the actual agreement, for it appears by the following 'rules and
regulations' . . . that every tenant is required to comply with 24
rules and regulations.9 °4 The lease should be viewed in the full
prospective of its statutory authorization, the policy behind the
statute, and the rules and regulations under which it is adminis-
tered.
On closer examination it would appear that the case of
Lynch v. United States95 would actually support a similar view-
ing of government contracts in this policy perspective. In Lynch
the government attempted to cancel outstanding war insurance
contracts on veterans. The Court ruled that the government had
the power to cancel these contractual obligations, but were never-
theless liable because the remedy for their breach remained unim-
paired.96 In requiring the government to abide by its contractual
obligation, the Court stated that under certain circumstances the
government might totally abrogate its duties in contracts. These
situations involve the exercise of the police power or some other
valid policy.97 But implied in Lynch is the requirement that in
considering the rights and liabilities in any contract in which the
government is a party, it is necessary to consider the policy factors
upon which the contract is based.98 Applying this latter rule to
public housing leases, policy factors would disallow an equation
of a public housing authority to a private landlord. The relation-
ship of government and public tenant is uniquely based on policy
factors which should affect the contractual rights and liabilities of
the parties.0 9
Further, a public housing authority is an administrative
agency; as such it is governed by the same rules which apply to all
administrative bodies. In terminating a tenant's right to continue
92. 29 App. Div. 2d at 396, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
93. 1 Misc. 2d 170, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
94. Id. at 172, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
95. That the government should be treated generally in the same
manner as a private individual in contractual relations, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
See discussion p. 318 supra.
96. 292 U.S. 571, 581.
97. Id. at 579.
98. 292 U.S. 571, 581. In Lynch it was stated that in contracts in
which the government is a party the rights and liabilities under the agree-
ment may be modified by an exercise of the "... federal police power or
some other paramount power." 292 U.S. 579.
99. The comparison of these factors, economic and political, reveals
substantial differences. See p. 309 supra.
occupancy, a public housing authority should give the tenant a
right to present a defense to the termination.10 0 An analogy may
be drawn to Hornsby v. Allen'10 where the plaintiff was refused
a liquor license without a stated reason or hearing. The Hornsby
court stated:
[W]hen a municipal or other governmental body grants
a license it is an adjudication that the applicant has com-
plied with the prescribed standards for the award of the
license. Similarly, the denial of a license is based on an
adjudication that the applicant has not satisfied these qual-
ifications and requirements.
1 02
A parallel may be drawn between the right of an applicant to be
issued a liquor license, and the tenant to continue occupancy of an
apartment which the government has, in effect, granted to him.
In both cases the administrative body applies a set of legal criteria,
qualifications, and requirements to an individual and makes a de-
cision which affects the individual's rights.
The Hornsby court concluded that because the administrative
act in question consisted of the determination of factual issues
and the application of legal criteria to them, a judicial act in which
the fundamental concepts of due process of law are applicable. Due
process of law in administrative proceedings of a judicial nature
must conform to fairness inherent in Anglo-Saxon jurispru-
dence.108
There have been other analogous areas requiring a hearing in
administrative adjudications.0 4 For example, in Standard Airlines
v. C.A.B.1 5 the court reviewed an administrative adjudication
which revoked the airline's letter of registration, which was re-
quired for operations. The court remanded the case because the
agency failed to give the airlines an opportunity to state its rea-
sons why the letter should not be revoked.0 6
These administrative law cases demonstrate that a hearing is
required if the individual is to have an opportunity to hear charges
against him and to offer him an opportunity to defend himself.
By similarly requiring a public housing authority to state its rea-
sons for termination of occupancy and providing for a hearing,
100. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT 119 (1959), states: "When adjudi-
cative facts are in dispute, our legal tradition is that the party affected is
entitled not only to rebut or explain the evidence against him but also to
'confront his accusers,' and to cross-examine them."
101. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
102. Id. at 608.
103. Id.
104. 177 F.2d 18 (U.S. Ct. App. D.C. 1949).
105. Id. at 21.
106. E.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Dept. of Agri-
culture setting commodity rates); Standard Airlines v. C.A.B., 177 F.2d 18
(U.S. Ct. App. D.C. 1949) (certificate of operation); Tadano v. Manny, 160
F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1947) (deportation proceeding); Perpente v. Moss, 293
N.Y. 325, 56 N.E.2d 726 (1944) (license to conduct employment agency).
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the individual would be given the opportunity to know why he is
being evicted and voice a defense. Securing due process of law
for the tenant in public housing will only result where there is a
procedure by which all the facts in controversy are brought out.
CONCLUSION
Considering the present state of the law in the area of pro-
cedural requirements for termination, it is apparent that there is
a need for new rules in public housing. The judicial imposition of
a reasonableness test as suggested in Vinson points in the correct
direction. But legislative action would appear to be the most
desirable solution to achieve clarity. H.U.D.'s Circular offers a
middle ground of administrative action by requiring a statement
of reasons and hearing in terminations. But the impact of the Cir-
cular has been weakened by decisions which circumvent its re-
quirements by distinguishing the facts in their particular cases.
A ruling by the Supreme Court in Thorpe affirming the binding
nature of the Circular would go far in achieving these procedural
requirements. 107
DAVID B. RAND
107. During the publication stages of this paper the United States Su-
preme Court rendered its decision in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of
Durham, 37 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1969). The Court decided that
H.U.D.'s Circular was mandatory and that local housing authorities are re-
quired to comply with its requirements in terminating tenancies. The
Court further stated that, with respect to Thorpe, the Circular should be
given retroactive effect. Citing the established rule that the appellate
court should apply the law in effect at the time the decision is rendered,
the Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision. Thus the notifica-
tion procedure required by the Circular is made mandatory for all fed-
erally assisted housing projects.
The affirmation of the Circular in Thorpe definitely places real re-
quirements upon the local authorites. But as seen in some of the recent
cases, its requirements may be easily circumvented. It would appear that
the final solution to this problem will rest with definite legislative stand-
ards promulgated either by the United States Congress or H.U.D. as more
definite requirements.
